

COMMENTARY

HAS EUROPE THE WILL TO FIGHT?

Since Korea, the Moral Climate Has Changed

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THE Communist aggression in Korea has acted as a catalytic agent in Western Europe. Almost overnight one sensed a new climate of moral unity—the indispensable prerequisite for any effective defense against Soviet might. But at the same time Korea brought to the surface a whole series of latent dissensions and mis-

understandings within the Western alliance. So this would seem to be the appropriate time to discuss frankly the many unavoidable differences between the European and American reactions to recent political events, differences which, once grasped, might spare many superfluous discordances, recriminations, and polemics.

AT THIS increasingly warm stage in the cold war, Americans, both in the government and out, are asking: Will Western Europe fight for the free world? Simultaneously, Europeans are asking: Will America fight for Europe? These questions intersect at what is probably the most delicate point in the Atlantic Pact. For if Europe has capitulated in advance, American arms sent to Europe may only end up in the service of the Red Army; and if America will not commit itself to the immediate defense of Europe—as distinguished from its eventual liberation—there is little reason for Europeans to make heavy sacrifices for a lost cause. So far, as HERBERT LÜTHY here points out, this problem has been dealt with largely as a matter of morale and public psychology, and answers have been sought more often in the fields of propaganda and “better understanding” than in that of action. Mr. Lüthy suggests that we had better look to some more substantial realities—and his article devotes itself to them. A historian by profession and a journalist by vocation, he writes regularly for the Swiss newspaper *Der Tat*, and for other European periodicals. His article on “France’s Homeless Left” appeared in the August COMMENTARY. The present article was translated from the German by Felix Giovanelli.

TODAY, four months after the alarm tocsin of Korea sounded, it is difficult even to recall the aimlessness and heedlessness which marked the Atlantic Conference in London, held last May. The discussions—there was little about them that was binding—then turned chiefly on the question of whether supplementary appropriations for defense could be expected from the individual member states. The official communiqués of the conference reflected a considerable complacency over the status and tempo of Western rearmament and nobody seriously called into question the assumption that the West had before it three or four years of grace for an undisturbed and painless gathering of its military strength. The Korean war swept this assumption away—it had never been based on much more than wishful thinking.

The first effect of the outbreak of the Korean war was a re-appraisal of the original rearmament timetable. Confronted by a challenge the implications of which could not be

blinked, the Western powers totted up their two or three full divisions and squadrons. The first reaction to the obviously catastrophic ratio between the military preparedness of Soviet Russia and its satellites on the one hand and that of the United States and its allies on the other was one of panic. "It is perhaps too late to save South Korea," was the opening sentence of *Le Monde's* first editorial comment after the beginning of hostilities. "Has not the prestige of the United States and of the United Nations been thoughtlessly staked? . . . It is to be feared that the events of the next few days will show that the game has been lost in advance and that American help will arrive too late. . . ."

The resolution with which the United States, cautiously followed by the other members of the United Nations, met the challenge, overcame this moment of discouragement and once again demonstrated the powers of improvisation of American strategy. But the time was past when paper plans, long-range programs, symbolic general staffs were enough to keep everyone happy. The call for dispatch and immediately effective measures now characterized all discussion. It was of course inevitable that the call should be especially directed by America—the strongest power—to the European member states of the Atlantic Pact. It was perhaps also inevitable that this call should at times take on a hysterical ring.

In democratic countries, where life and public opinion are not ordered by the dictates of an all-powerful politburo and where discussion, not barrack-room discipline, is the rule, it is a fact that grim resolutions looking to preparedness cannot be realized without a price paid in the form of alarmism and war psychosis. And in such cases, war psychosis far outruns material rearmament. Such military steps as the building up of divisions, officer training, munitions production, all the monstrously complicated machinery of a modern army, have their "inertia," their own schedules, which can be abridged but not eliminated by massive planning and appropriations. In consequence, there is always a

rush to make gestures of decisiveness which will assure the public that the paralyzing moment of weakness has been overcome. The need for such gestures was particularly great this summer. But immediately after they were made, and partly as a result of them, the first discordant notes in the Atlantic Nations' chorus of moral unity were heard.

AMERICA did not hear from Europe the note of virile decision that she expected, and made no effort to hide her disappointment. On the other hand, the clarion calls—much magnified for the benefit of the coming American elections—that could be heard from Washington diffused as much terror in Europe as they did encouragement. The glaring discrepancy in attitudes may be expressed by a formula: whereas, for that sector of American opinion which is most vocally represented by radio and press, the war in Korea was quite simply a stage in an accepted "war against Communism," in Europe every discussion began with the premise that "a war must be avoided."

To understand this, it suffices to look at a world map, to measure off not only the distances from the present theater of hostilities, but to mark off the probable boundaries of the theater of a general war. The Red Army is not on the Elbe as is commonly said—the notion of a line on the Elbe is one of the many mystifications which quite inexplicably haunt all international discussions—but on the Hessian-Thuringian frontier halfway between the Elbe and the Rhine; and, militarily speaking, today nothing stands between it and the Atlantic Ocean. "If Russia should decide tomorrow to send the Red Army on a march to Brest, it would march to Brest, and this without the slightest difficulty," Paul Reynaud pointed out last August in the French Chamber. The French Minister of Defense questioned the timeliness of these words but not their truth.

What holds the Red Army back from this little promenade is not the opposition of an effective military force on the Continent, but the danger of a world war, which would not end for Russia with the conquest of Europe,

but would begin with it. However, there is no doubt that, under present conditions, the war *would* be ended for a vast portion of Western Europe well before it became a world conflict; and, whatever the hope of a later liberation, it would be ended in a tragically definitive sense. "In the techniques of occupation, the Nazis were mere dilettantes"—such were the words of a Russian field marshal which Reynaud quoted in the above-mentioned speech and to which he added: "After three months of Russian occupation you would never recognize France again."

These are commonplaces, but people slide over their implications when they freely declaim against European and, in particular, French defeatism. Such defeatism does exist. It would be astonishing if it did not. But involved here are also simply the realistic fears of those who have not—at least not yet—the means to protect themselves. Even decisions to build up military strength and fortify positions of defense are embraced without exultation and without loud proclamations of intention, for such steps are made under the eye of an enemy power which for some time to come will be overwhelmingly strong.

So it is that the word "provocation," which has become virtually meaningless to American ears, still retains a very palpable meaning for the West European continent. It is difficult to exaggerate the catastrophic effects upon the allies of the United States of the "preventive war" credo of certain high-placed American politicians, of the open affront made against the Russian delegates at a diplomatic banquet by their American hosts, of the tone of many congressional debates, of warlike gestures centering around Formosa, China, and the atom bomb. Even allowing for the overheated electoral atmosphere of America, there is still nothing reassuring about the thought that the foreign policy of the greatest world power of our time—a policy on which the fate of the free world hangs—is paralyzed for months every two years and for a full year every four years by congressional and presidential elections,

that the weightiest international decisions are made the football of partisan rivalry. It should be kept in mind that an understanding of the quite unique institutions and traditions of American life, which provoke—in spite of everything—an admiration for the manner in which American democracy continues to surmount its own limitations and difficulties, is much less diffused in Europe than is an understanding of European institutions and traditions in America.

BUT the divergence in the respective reactions of America and Europe was shown not only in those gestures and speeches which, owing to the radical differences in political vocabularies, are misunderstood once they cross the Atlantic. Even the announced common resolution to create, within a year or two, strong defense forces on the European continent, soon revealed sharp differences between the American and European approaches to this matter.

Between such an announcement and realization stretches a period dangerous in the extreme, of a nature to invite intervention on the part of that power, i.e. Russia, against whom these preparations are directed. It is plain that this danger must be risked. To shrink before it would mean to throw oneself on the tender mercies of the Soviet Union in an effort not to irritate it. But it is one thing to set rearmament in motion and quite another to sound off with plans which at best take months or years to carry out. The fuss over German rearmament is the most striking example of this haste to make threatening gestures on the basis of future—not actual—strength, a haste that breeds dissension within the West.

That the rearming of Germany or, as it is put, "the integration of Germany into the defense of Europe," is the ultimate logical consequence of the Atlantic Pact, nobody will deny; in fact, that was one of the main arguments advanced against the pact in those countries which only several years ago had been liberated from the German occupation. But the pact has many other prior steps—much closer to home—which are still far

from being achieved. One of these is the creation of a European defense organization of which Germany could be a member; so long as such an organization is not in being, the word "integration" will remain humbug or a euphemism for a German mercenary force under the occupation powers—and no one in Germany will hear of such a thing. Put more simply: the most immediate corollary of the Atlantic Pact is the military preparation of the member states themselves; but even this has remained a paper affair at the very time of the debate on a resurrected German army.

A YEAR after the signing of the military assistance pact, armament deliveries to the European signatory states had not even reached 15 per cent of the credits allotted for the year. The surpluses available from American inventories corresponded only in small part with European needs; and not only were opportunities for new contracts limited by America's own requirements, but delivery deadlines were moved back further and further. In the beginning of August, the French and British foreign ministers made it clear that an extension of the period of military service was out of the question so long as no additional weapons and munitions were on hand. When, one month later, both countries anyway announced such an extension, that was more an answer to diplomatic and psychological pressures than an outcome of altered material circumstances. The twenty rebuilt Sherman tanks from the last war (the first American delivery at Cherbourg that was not merely symbolic) were hardly enough to affect the tragic shortage of modern weapons and trained officers in the French army. Actually, the introduction of longer military service is bound to take place much more slowly than has been announced, for it adds neither to military strength nor morale to keep men under the colors who, for lack of arms and officers, must be kept busy with potato-peeling, aimless marching, and drill—as is now only too often the case.

Under these circumstances, the declaration of principle on German rearmament

can be interpreted only as either a precipitate gesture of dubious immediate utility or as a decision to give priority to the rearmament of Germany over the rearmament of its Western neighbors—a decision which would blow the foundation of the Atlantic Pact sky-high. It has perhaps not been sufficiently observed that French "refractoriness" is not based on hostility to the intention of including Germany in the Atlantic Pact but rather on the timing of such an announcement of intention. The emotional relations between France and Germany would, to be fully grasped, require a very exact and nuanced study. But this much can be said with some confidence: the psychological presuppositions upon which a genuine Franco-German partnership can be based are maturing with amazing rapidity, more so in the provinces than in Paris, more so among the common people than among intellectuals and politicians, and more so beneath the surface than on it. But it would not be rendering a service to Franco-German amity were Germany to be rigged up overnight, by means of a sensational proclamation and a few symbolic weapons, into something that Communists could pass off as a "German menace." *

* The British attitude to this question would require an analysis apart. It is a century-old British tradition to play France and Germany off against each other on the European continent. Anachronistic as such a balance-of-power policy may seem today, so deeply rooted a tradition cannot be extirpated overnight. Great Britain did not share the fate of the European continent in the last war and, at bottom, feels as remote as ever from it. In lieu of further explanation, I quote the conclusion of a study which the *Observer* devoted to the question of German rearmament in the issue of September 24: "Indeed, if Germany in five or ten years became a threat again, would not the first effect of this be to re-create a common interest between Russia and the West and restore some of the conditions which in the past have so often made Russia and Britain allies? Might not the revival of a slight common fear of Germany even be the key to better relations between Russia and the West, and to a return of mutual tolerance?" It is quite unthinkable that anybody, anywhere in continental Europe, would be capable of a train of thought of this kind, in which the renewal of old and bloody European conflicts is seen only as furnishing the small chance for a Russo-British understanding.

THE ONLY possible way to bring about a real rearmament of Germany would be the restoration of the recently dismantled armament industry in the Ruhr, which lies within immediate reach of the present jumping-off positions of the Red Army—a solution so adventurous that it has been scarcely discussed in public up to now. In any case, the shift from the material and spiritual demilitarization of Germany, just brought to a conclusion this summer, to remilitarization, will be a complex and lengthy process. And it is not very useful to discuss it with heat and exasperation, under the white light of publicity, in such terms as to suggest that it is not a long-range and, at the moment, theoretical problem, but rather something that calls for an immediate *levée en masse*, for which the doors of the recruiting stations should be flung open tomorrow morning.

Above all, German rearmament is a problem calling for a decision the implications of which deserve very exact consideration—and this not only out of regard for the psychological impact on Germany's Western neighbors. What does a German army mean? It means an army for a divided and mutilated land, a land whose citizens could never accept "defense of the Fatherland" to mean defense of an insane line of demarcation cutting across Germany. Germany does not end at the Thuringian forest, not at Potsdamer Platz, and not at the Oder-Neisse line. A German army, which would almost necessarily be recruited mostly from Eastern refugees, would turn out to be a "liberation army," with the reconquest of East Germany as its fixed goal, whether explicit or not—and Germans are inclined, if anything, to be explicit about it.

That this question, and with it the whole unbearable bisection of Europe, will sooner or later have to be settled, in some way now unforeseeable, is not to be denied; its shadow has lain heavily over Europe ever since the idiotic peace of Yalta and Potsdam. But, seen from a European point of view, it would certainly not be advisable to raise it in a hectically melodramatic fashion without having in the least reflected how it is to be

solved and without being in the least on guard, politically or diplomatically, against the kind of mere declaration of principle that would have as its one sure outcome the promotion of new support for Russia in all the Eastern states bordering Germany.

But must not a beginning be made somehow? A beginning *has* been made with the recent decision to fit out a West German police corps, which would be the counterpart of the East German "People's Police." As long as the means of the Atlantic powers suffice only for the equipping of such a police corps, it is scarcely useful to raise the specter of a possible future German army. It would be difficult to find a subject less appropriate to present needs than the one that was brought up under the glare of the Waldorf-Astoria chandeliers and in the heat of an election campaign, accompanied by such arguments *ad baculum* as, "We must take soldiers where we can find them," "A bared fist is something the Soviets can understand," and "Now is not the time for hair-splitting." Now is, above all, no time for theatricalities.

BUT such considerations as those of timeliness, priority, and political tact, much as they figured in the exasperation of American-European relations this summer, do not go to the heart of the matter. It is apparent that public opinion in the United States expected a clearcut answer to the question: does Europe really have the will to defend itself? It is this question which lies tragically at the bottom of the very real misunderstanding between America and Europe, and it is not to be denied that there are good grounds for asking it. It would be an evasion to answer—though it is true—that sometimes the will to resist is furthered by rearmament, and that morale is often primarily a matter of being armed. For America could put it the other way around: what sense does it make to arm peoples who deep down have already capitulated?

The discussion of this question during the summer was burdened by this cloud of doubt. While America awaited an unmistakable

demonstration of European resoluteness, France and Germany demanded American reinforcements on the European continent. This demand came as something tactless and inappropriate at a moment when American public opinion was complaining bitterly that for all practical purposes the United States alone was bearing the costs and making the sacrifices in a war decided upon in common. So the recriminations went back and forth. In the American commentaries on the French memorandum the bitter phrase of "conditional will to resist" came to the surface, which was matched in France by another bitter phrase, "sacrificial cannon fodder," for was it not to this that the Anglo-Saxon powers had traditionally destined France while reserving for themselves the privilege of fighting a "de luxe war" on the sea and in the air?

Actually, this last phrase, a "de luxe war," is a compendium of the whole criticism directed against the Atlantic defense system, a criticism which the French were at no pains to conceal at the time of the signing of the Atlantic Pact and which will undoubtedly be heard even more loudly from Germany. It would be fatal to confound it without further ado with defeatism. Western European nations, for whom all retreat is cut off in case of war and who will fight it out on their own soil, must always find disquieting the freedom of movement of those allies who are primarily sea and air powers. This is a matter of geography, and geography is not something that can be changed at will. In the Atlantic system, the immediate, the mortal risk is situated on one side of the Atlantic, the economic and military potential on the other, and in the very front line stand the chronic invalids of two world wars: Germany, which has the Red Army not on its frontier but in its midst, and France, which twice in a generation has had to bear the brunt of the attack, bleeding freely from it in the First World War and collapsing utterly in the Second.

For the Anglo-Saxon powers, the old English recipe of winning a war in the last battle still makes sense. But for the conti-

mental states of Western Europe, the first battle might well, under present circumstances, be a matter of life and death. The demand for formidable military assistance to Europe, not weeks and months after an outbreak of war but from the very outset, is therefore thoroughly understandable. Criticism which grows from the absence of such plans for immediate and decisive aid is not limited to Communists, neutralists, and defeatists. General de Gaulle's incessant protests against the subordination of French needs to Anglo-American strategic planning, which cold-bloodedly envisages, in case of need, a retreat behind the Pyrenees and the Suez, spring from just this consideration. It should be firmly understood that with the activation of German military potential, similar protests from the German side would ring out even more loudly and insistently; and the very real Franco-German solidarity on this question might well prevail in the end over all ancient mistrust.

THE forthright American intervention in Korea undoubtedly stilled those critics of the Atlantic Pact—they were not in fact very numerous—who cast doubts on the sincerity and effectiveness of American promises of aid. But the progress of the campaign has not given the lie to those critics who declared that "the Atlantic Pact no doubt assures the ultimate punishment of the aggressor, but it cannot hinder him from murdering his victim at will." The first short-term effect of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, and of the consequent fear of a broadening of the war, was to polarize minds in two camps. On the one hand, there was a stiffening of the will to resist at any price. On the other, there was a welling up of defeatism, which in the upper crust—that upper crust which had already demonstrated the quality of its patriotism and courage in 1940—was translated into a flight of capital and a scramble for visas; and which, among the broad masses, was translated into a strongly growing response to the Communist "peace campaign" and a limited but ominous swelling of the membership rolls of the Communist party.

Such was the momentary effect. Now one can make out another, a slower and deeper tendency at work in the opposite direction. It has come into being almost independently of the political and legal aspects of the Korean war: not much in the way of indignation over the North Korean aggression could be worked up, and nothing at all in the way of sympathy for Syngman Rhee's "democracy." Even the military course of the campaign with its reverses and successes had little decisive effect on the psychological transformation to which I refer: this transformation made itself felt before the Seoul landing, which marked the turning point of the war.

What was decisive was that in Korea war was once again taking on its old, familiar, "classical" form, namely, a war waged with rifles, artillery, fighter planes, hand-to-hand combats, infantry assaults in mud and heat and rain, a war which was murderous, grim, and dirty, as wars have always been, but which was being waged on a human scale. It was not that metaphysical push-button war of the future, over poles and across continents, led by a handful of technicians, a war whose image had been made current by a flood of popular literature and propaganda. It can be simply put that the Korean campaign has made the idea of a European defense once again quite thinkable for the "common man."

THIS may have an absurd ring but it is scarcely an exaggeration: the thought of a possible defense of one's country had become outmoded in many West European nations with old military traditions. That a state like France should be anything other than a passive battlefield in the conflict between East and West had become utterly unbelievable in the last few years. It seemed to enter the reckonings of neither France's political leaders nor the strategists of the Atlantic Pact that France could do more than defend herself internally in the "cold war" (a phrase that has suddenly become outmoded) and maintain law and order. They reasoned that European defense meant

the Marshall Plan, economic and social legislation, and, if necessary, the police. In case of military aggression from without there were of course America's atom bombs; there was no need for Europeans who did not have the bomb to concern themselves—they could contribute nothing. The problem of war and peace was one that lay beyond all European responsibility, for one of two things was thought to be true. Either the threat of the Horror Bomb ruled war out, and in that case it was certainly cleverer to divert Europe's war-damaged economy to peaceful production instead of squandering money and labor on out-of-date and useless barracks and cannon. Or, perhaps, the bomb was no hindrance to war, and a war would take place. So then there would begin that "modern war" which had been depicted in a thousand styles: the total apocalypse, the annihilation of all organic life in the battle areas, the loosening of cosmic forces of destruction with no possibility of defense or even of individual self-preservation. In such a world catastrophe, the intervention of soldiers of the old "classic" type would be not only needless but quite unimaginable. For the populations of the European No Man's Land, "it didn't matter what happened."

The American propagandists for the atomic bomb had certainly never imagined that such might turn out to be the result of mass exportation of trashy horror literature about super-bombs and wonder weapons. No one can confidently say whether the Russians were intimidated by it, but at all events it spread among the peoples of Western Europe not a feeling of security but of comatose apathy.

This paralyzing myth of the atom bomb was not an inspired creation of Russian propaganda, but a quite unforeseeable result of American publicity. The Communists in fact sought for a long time to neutralize its shuddersome effects, to belittle the bomb, before it dawned upon them what wonderful propaganda capital could be squeezed from this hobgoblin; whereupon, they sent out their "peace partisans" with Stockholm

peace petitions in hand. And it was not only the man on the street who seemed, under the influence of this nightmare, to wave aside the question of national defense by a "what's the use?" Neither the European military authorities nor the Americans participating in plans for European defense had been able in two years of talks, proposals, and plans to get past the holiday-speech stage. The "European General Staff" at Fontainebleau carried on mass maneuvers with hypothetical troops, the United States was pledged to defend the demarcation line with hypothetical troops, and whenever a tangible reality was sought behind all the committees, staffs, and bureaus of the Atlantic Pact, all that could be found boiled down to one single thing: the threat to drop the bomb.

The consequence was that not only American senators, but even a very pacifistically inclined editor of *Le Monde*, an organ strongly tending to neutralism and peace politics, came out several days after the outbreak of the Korean war with a wild outcry, under the characteristic title, "Sodom and Gomorrah": "Drop the Bomb!" (He did not specify where.) Fortunately, it was not dropped. The reality of the Korean war has wiped away the fantasies spun out by amateur strategists about the War of the Future, and has made it possible to view old-fashioned land defense as not only something more than a chimera but as a necessary and possible, if bitter, task which is not the affair of a few technicians but of a whole citizenry.

This is a reversal whose moral and political implications cannot be disregarded: when the feeling of resigned helplessness is overcome, the Fifth Column will have lost its most potent trump card. It means a sweeping change of the moral climate and it is in this new climate that a measure like the prolongation of the period of universal military service has become possible. This measure is a clear and unmistakable sign to every young Frenchman or Belgian that he counts for something and that the soldier has ceased to be a hopelessly anachronistic comic figure in the humorous weeklies of the atomic era.

The furious and helpless reaction mani-

festated by the Communist party to the extension of military service best shows how ripe the time was for the psychological shock: for the first time Communist propaganda finds itself on the defensive. It has been unable to profit by the fact that, as was to be expected, everyone raised a grumble about the extension. The French soldier has always grumbled but this has not kept him from fighting well when not sent out, as in 1940, with old breech-loaders against tanks and dive bombers. The Stockholm appeal, which was plastered this spring and summer over all the billboards of France, has, along with the big talk about wonder weapons, receded into a remote past; and a deathlike silence has settled around the Communists' general order against the production, loading, and transport of war matériel, an order which was at the center of their agitation for several months and led to incidents in all France. The Communist strategy was possible only so long as any thought of military defense of the country appeared as a bad joke in the eyes of the public. That time is over and done with.

TO BE sure, there are darker aspects of the picture. It is very doubtful that the regimes—French, Italian, German—of continental Europe have the capacity to equalize the burdens of rearmament by a minimum of social justice or to even avert a general fall in the standard of living and, concomitantly, a shameful enrichment of the parasitic layers of society. In the exposed and absurd situation in which the continental rump of Western Europe finds itself, fertile ground will long be available for the Communist exploitation of fear.

But, for a just estimate of the bearing of the new development, it is necessary to measure from what zero point it started. No one who, with open eyes and ears, goes through France and compares the present reactions of Frenchmen with the reactions of these selfsame Frenchmen several months back, can fail to see that a change is in progress and that it does not end at the limits of hitherto Communist zones of influence.

There is, of course, no sign of what could be called enthusiasm. It is an arduous process to have to accustom oneself all over again to the idea that preparation for war is still in the realm of possibility and cannot be shrugged off by a "what's the use?"

Nevertheless, the concept of national defense is bound to remain somewhat infected by a residue of skepticism. It has been suggested, in an attempt to overcome this, that "national defense" be replaced by the "defense of Europe" as an inspiring slogan. True, "Europe" at the present moment is still a mere geographical conception, when it is not the usurped label of powerless and helpless ministerial and parliamentary conferences, and it is no doubt simpler and easier to put on a war footing national armies that five years ago were waging war against each other and, out of an urge to avoid a troublesome waste of time, by-pass the tedious political and institutional detours leading up to the creation of a European Union, which in essence would be a Franco-German union. But it would be short-sighted and fatal to forget the foundation for the sake of rapidly constructing a façade. And the foundation is a European Union.

However, the idea of European Union is not a simple one, and some of its implications are only beginning to be drawn. Schuman's stubborn opposition to proclaiming Germany's remilitarization before even a

beginning had been made in his work of Franco-German understanding sprang in great measure from a need to protect the whole work of Franco-German reconciliation which had been carried out in the face of tremendous political and psychological opposition. It also sprang in part from apprehension as to the consequences: with the entry of Germany into the Western alliance, the latter would inevitably inherit the demand of German irridentists for the reunification of Germany.

This problem, which is keenly felt throughout the breadth of Germany, has just come to the surface of political consciousness this autumn. And here there has begun a new psychological process, which it would be premature to speak about: if the positive watchword around which Western Europe can rally is still wanting, it is ultimately because a mere defense of Western Europe is in the long run absurd and impossible, just as a mere defense of the Korean Republic was: nobody is eager to fight and to die for a 38th parallel. A defense which is no more than defensive is itself a capitulation. The real alternative lies between *the spirit of the offensive* and defeatism.

At present a shaky interregnum prevails; the thought of a necessary, though in form and extent not yet foreseeable, reclamation of Europe for the West is just now beginning to dawn.